Communicative and cultural memory by Assmann, Jan
Communicative and Cultural 
Memory
Jan Assmann
T
he past exists if it can be said to exist at all—in a double form: as sedimentation 
of relics, traces and personal memories on the one hand, and as a social construc­
tion on the other. This doubleness applies already to our personal past which is 
with us in all kinds of internal memory traces and external memory symbols, but also as 
an image or narrative we construe and carry with us as our autobiographical or episodic 
memory. As hdaurice Halbwachs has shown, even our autobiographical memory is a 
social construction which we build up in communication with others. Only in its first 
aspect, as a sedimentation or unstructured archive, it can be said to be strictly personal 
(Halbwachs). As a social construction or narrative, the past conveys a kind of connective 
structure or diachronic identity to societies, groups and individuals, both in the social 
and in the temporal dimension.
Memory is knowledge with an identity-index. Ibis is not to say that this knowledge 
is all about oneself; on the contrary, it refers to all kinds of things of the outward and the 
inward worlds, but with a strong link to an idea of “self” that accompanies this knowledge 
and sets it off against normal, identity-neutral knowledge. In memory theory, this self­
reference is called the “autonoetic” function of memory (Markowitsch and Welzer). It is 
by virtue of this function that memory provides what I would call a “connective structure” 
both to persons and societies (see Jan Assmann Early Civilization). This connective struc­
ture seems to be a human specificity based on the exclusively human faculties of symbol­
ization and communication. A human self is a “diachronic identity,” built “of the stuff 
of time” (Luckmann 67-91). Human memory brings about a synthesis of time and 
identity, both on the collective and on the personal level which may be called a dia­
chronic identity. It is this identity which allows human beings both personally and col­
lectively to orient themselves in time. This applies to the future as well as to the past. 
Due to our memory, we are able to think in temporal horizons far beyond our birth and 
our death.
This connection between time, identity and memory can be shown to work on the 
three levels of the individual, the social and the cultural. As we may distinguish between 
the inner time of our physical self, the social time we share with others and the historical 
or mythical time, we may distinguish between individual, social and cultural memory. 
Maurice Halbwachs developed the concept of social or “collective” memory. He was
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careful, however, to keep this concept apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions 
and transferences which we propose to subsume under the term “cultural memory.” We 
preserve Halbwachs’ distinction by breaking up his concept of collective memory into 
“communicative” and “cultural memory,” but we insist on treating the cultural sphere, 
which he excluded, as another form of memory. We are, therefore, not arguing for replac­
ing his idea of “collective memory” with “cultural memory”; rather, we distinguish between 
both forms as two different modi memorandi, ways of remembering.
We may thus distinguish between embodied and embedded memory. Personal mem­
ory is embodied in our brain and neuro-mental system, social memory is embedded in 
the constellations of social communication but still embodied in the brains of the par­
ticipants and cultural memory is neatly disembodied, exteriorized, objectified and em­
bedded in cultural institutions such as rituals, feasts, texts, archives, all kinds of sym­
bolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the sight of gestures are stable and situ- 
ation-transcendant, able to be transferred from one situation to another and transmitted 
from one generation to another. In order to work as a memory, however, its symbolic 
forms have not only to be preserved but also to be circulated and reembodied in a society. 
The disembodied status of cultural memory is a reason for its not having been recognized 
as a form of memory until recently. Memory, the argument runs, requires a mind. There­
fore, things like Marcel Prousts famous Madeleine, or monuments, archives, libraries, 
anniversaries, feasts, icons, symbols, land- and town-scapes cannot have or carry mem­
ory, because they lack a mind. This objection, however, rests on a complete misunder­
standing. Neither Proust nor Halbwachs nor anyone else who uses the term “collective 
memory” ever held that collective or cultural memory “exists in something that has no 
mind.” Things do not “have” a memory of their own, but they may remind us, may trig­
ger our memory because they carry our memories which we have invested into them, 
things such as dishes, feasts, rites, images, texts, landscapes, and so forth. This interaction 
between a remembering mind and a reminding object is the reason why the realm of 
things and especially of the things meant as reminders, that is, monuments and lieux de 
memoire have to be included into our concept of memory. Moreover, groups do not 
“have” a memory in the way individuals do, but they may “make” themselves a memory 
by erecting monuments, cherishing their lieux de memoire and by developing a variety 
of cultural (mnemo-)techniques supporting memory or promoting forgetting.
This institutional character does not apply to what Halbwachs called collective mem­
ory and what we propose to rename communicative memory. Communicative memory 
is non-institutional; it is not supported by any institutions of learning, transmission and 
interpretation, it is not cultivated by specialists and is not summoned or celebrated on 
special occasions; it is not formalized and stabilized by any form of material symboliza­
tion but lives in everyday interaction and communication and, for this very reason, has 
only a limited time depth which normally reaches not farther back than 80 years, the 
time span of three interacting generations. Change of constellations and of frames brings 
about forgetting; the durability of memories depends on the durability of social bonds 
and “frames” (see J. Assmann, “Cultural Memory” and A. Assmann “Memory”).
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Jan Vansina, an anthropologist who worked with tribal societies in Africa, devoted an 
important study to the form in which they represent the past (Vansina). He observed a 
tripartite structure. The recent past which looms large in interactive communication has 
a limited depth in time, reaching not beyond three generations. Concerning a more re­
mote past, there is either a total gap of information or one or two names are produced 
with great hesitation. Since this gap shifts with the succession of generations, Vansina 
calls it the “Floating gap.” For the most remote past, however, there is again a profusion 
of information dealing with traditions about the origin of the world and the early his­
tory of the tribe. This information, however, is not committed to everyday communica­
tion but intensely formalized and institutionalized. It exists in forms of narratives, songs, 
dances, rituals, masks and symbols, specialists such as narrators, bards, mask-carvers and 
others are organized in guilds and have to undergo long periods of initiation, instruction 
and examination, hdoreover, it requires for its actualization certain occasions when the 
community comes together for some celebration or other. This is what we propose to call 
“cultural memory.”
Vansina’s “Floating Gap” higlights the difference between communicative and cul­
tural memory. The communicative memory contains memories that an individual shares 
with his contemporaries. This is what Halbwachs understood by “collective memory” 
and what forms the object of Oral History, that branch of historical research that bases 
itself not on the usual written sources of historiography, but exclusively on memories 
gained in oral interviews. All studies in Oral History confirm that even in literate societ­
ies where the border between communicative and cultural memory is much less pro­
nounced than in purely oral societies, living memory goes no further back than 80 years 
after which, separated by the floating gap, come, instead of myths of origin, the dates 
from schoolbooks and monuments.
Cultural memory is based on fixed points in the past. Even here, however, the past is 
not preserved as such but is galvanized in symbols as they are represented in oral myths 
or in writings, performed in feasts, and as they continually illuminate a changing present 
In the context of cultural memory, the distinction between myth and history vanishes 
Not the past as such, as it is investigated and reconstructed by archaeologists and histo­
rians, counts for the cultural memory, but only the past as it is remembered, that is, the 
past with an identity-index. Cultural memory reaches back into the past only so far as 
the past can be reclaimed as “ours.” This is why we refer to this form of historical con­
sciousness as “memory and not just as knowledge about the past. While knowledge has 
no form and is endlessly progressive, memory involves forgetting. It is only by forgetting 
what lies outside the horizon of the relevant that it performs an identity-function Nie­
tzsche circumscribed this function by notions such as “plastic power” and “horizon ” 
obviously intending the same thing for which now the term “identity” has become gen­
erally accepted (Nietzsche).
'The difference between communicative and cultural memory expresses itself also in 
the social dimension, in the structure of participation. The participation of a group in 
memory is diffuse. It has been acquired by the participants along withcommunicative
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language and social competence. There are no specialists of communicative memory. The 
cultural memory, by contrast, has always its specialists. To these belong shamans, bards, 
griots as well as priests, teachers, artists, clerks, scholars, mandarins, rabbis, mullas and 
however these specialized carriers of memory are called.
But even where the sacred tradition is committed to writing, memorisation plays the 
central role. There is, however, still another sense in which the participation in cultural 
memory may be structured in a society. This concerns the question of restricted knowl­
edge, of secrecy and esotericism. Every traditional society knows areas of restricted knowl­
edge whose boundaries are not simply defined by the different capacities of human 
memory and understanding, but also by questions of access and initiation. In Judaism, 
for example, general participation is required in the Torah which every (male) member 
of the group is supposed to know by heart. Specialized participation concerns the world 
of Talmudic and Medieval commentaries, codices and midrash, a vast body of literature 
that only specialists can master. Secrecy, however, shrouds the esoteric world of Cabbala, 
to which only select adepts (and after they have reached the age of 40 years) are admitted. 
The participation structure of cultural memory has an inherent tendency to elitism; it is 
never strictly egalitarian. Cultivating one’s cultural memory means accumulating sym­
bolic capital. Some have to prove their degree of admittance by formal exams (as in 
traditional China); or by the mastery of linguistic registers (as in England) or of the 
“ Citatenschatz des deutschen Vo Ikes' (treasure of German quotations) as in 19th century 
Germany. Others remain systematically excluded from this “distinguished” knowledge 
like the women in ancient Greece, traditional China and orthodox Judaism or the lower 
classes in the heydays of German “ Bildungsbiirgertum”
Transitions and Transformations account for the dynamics of cultural memory. Two 
typical directions have a structural significance and need to be at least briefly mentioned 
in this context. One concerns the transition from autobiographical and communicative 
memory into cultural memory, and the other concerns, within cultural memory, the 
move from the back stage to down stage, from the periphery into the center, from la­
tency or potentiality to manifestation or actualization and vice-versa. These shifts presup­
pose structural boundaries which are to be crossed: the boundary between embodied and 
mediated forms of memory, and the boundary between what Aleida Assmann proposes 
to call “working” and “storage memories” or “canon” and “archive” (A. Assmann, Mem­
ory). We are presently living through a period of transition from communicative to 
cultural memory; the main problem is how to preserve the personal memories of holocaust 
survivors and other eye witnesses to the catastrophes in the context of World War II and 
how to transform them into durable forms of cultural memory that may be transmitted 
to later generations.
The biblical book of Deuteronomy offers a striking parallel to this situation (J. Ass­
mann, Cultural Memory, 191-205). The problem then was how to preserve the memory 
of the generation who has witnessed the events in the context of the exodus from Egypt 
and the revelation of the Law into the cultural memory of a society that could be hand­
ed down to an infinite number of future generations. The aim of this text is to teach both
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what to remember and how to remember, that is, both the lesson that must never be 
forgotten and the mnemotechnique that ensures its continuous transmission. Moses 
outlines a full-fledged mnemotechnique of individual and collective remembering.
The book of Deuteronomy is the foundational text of a religion based on a covenant 
between one single god and a chosen people. In this new religion, memory is to play the 
central role. It deals with a revolutionary change of cultural memory. Normally, cultural 
memory is not instituted this way but accumulates and changes in the course of centuries. 
The mnemotechnique of Moses belongs more to political than to cultural memory (for 
this distinction see A. Assmann, “Memory”). Political memory is highly normative, pre­
scribing what must by no means be forgotten in order to form and to belong to a po­
litical identity. The case of Deuteronomy closely corresponds to this concept as it follows 
and elaborates a model that belongs to the political sphere. It is a ritual that Esarhaddon 
of Assyria had introduced to make a memory for the vassals of his empire. First, they had 
to travel to Niniveh in order to swear an oath of loyalty to Esarhaddon and his desig­
nated successor Assurbanipal. Then, in order not to forget this oath once they have returned 
to their home cities, they must annually perform a ritual that will refresh their memory. 
This ritual is dedicated to the goddess Ishtar of Arbela.
Water from a sarsaru-jar, she (Ishtar of Arbela) let them drink,
a goblet of 1 Seah (= ca. 6 1.) she filled with water from the sarsaru-jar and presented 
it to them saying:
In your hearts you will speak thus: Ishtar, a narrow one is she! (meaning: only a 
local deity, ignorant of what is going on far off)
thus: you will return to your cities and will eat bread in your districts, and will 
forget these contractual stipulations
TW You will drink from this water and again remember and observe these 
contractua stipulations which 1 set up concerning Esarhaddon. (j. Assmann, Tm 
Studies, 10)
Out of this and certainly a lot of similar rituals of memory to be periodically repeated, 
Deuteronomy develops an entire culture of remembrance and a life-form which we have 
come to understand by the term “religion” and which then became the model for later 
world-religions, such as Christianity and Islam. This new type of religion comprises much 
more than just cult, it extends to every aspect of life and especially focuses on justice and 
morality; it develops not out of pagan cults but out of the political system which it means 
to supersede as a form of liberation, emancipation and enlightenment. It thus represents 
a totally new form both of religion and of socio-political organisation, which is primar­
ily based on memory.
Again we meet with the connection between memory and society. Memory enables 
us to live in groups and communities and living in groups and communities enables us 
to build a memory. This connection between memory and belonging is not only a mat­
ter of self-regulating or “auto-poietic” evolution as Halbwachs presented it to be. It is
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also a matter of political institution or fabrication. Both remembering and belonging 
have normative aspects. If you want to belong, you MUST remember: ZAKHOR, re­
member, is the Jewish imperative (Yerushalmi).
Also the Assyrian mnemotechnique was meant as the foundation of a political mem­
ory, were memory is an obligation. If you want to belong to the Assyrian empire and be 
safe from its political violence: remember the loyalty oath you have sworn. If you forget, 
you will be punished and expelled. But here, the memory is still purely ritual; whereas 
the Deuteronomic mnemotechnique is primarily based on written and oral language. As 
a form of memory, ritual is based on repetition. Each performance must follow as close­
ly as possible a fixed model in order to make the actual performance resemble in every 
respect the previous ones. Thus, the flow of time is brought into a pattern that combines 
the irreversible and the reversible, the passing time and the returning time. Human life 
and social institutions are, thus, rescued from just passing away, decaying and vanishing, 
but are integrated into the natural cycles of regeneration. Repetition is a form of preser­
vation, thus, of memory.
The decisive difference between ritual memory and the Torah, for example, is the fact 
that the first is known only to specialists who have to learn it by heart, whereas the latter 
is taught to everybody and every member of the community is expected to know it by 
heart. If, in civilizations following the ritual model, the cultural memory which is stored 
in specialized memories is to be made public and to circulate in general communication, 
it is during some feasts when the larger public is admitted to the public performance of 
rituals and to listening to the recitation of the sacred texts. This difference in participation 
is very clearly brought to the fore in a passage from Josephus’ pamphlet Contra Apionem:
Can any government be more holy than this? or any Religion better adapted to 
the nature of the Deity? Where, in any place but in this, are the whole People, by 
the special diligence of the Priests, to whom the care of public instruction is 
committed, accurately taught the principles of true piety? So that the body-politic 
seems, as it were, one great Assembly, constantly kept together, for the celebration 
of some sacred Mysteries. For those things which the Gentiles keep up for a few 
days only that is, during those solemnities they call Mysteries and Initiations, we, 
with vast delight, and a plenitude of knowledge, which admits of no error, fully 
enjoy, and perpetually contemplate through the whole course of our lives. (193ff)
In spite of their extensive use of memorisation and even writing, the “pagan” religions 
were still relying on ritual continuity. Rituals and texts are both solutions of the problem 
how to make the transient permanent and thus to establish continuity. This is also the 
problem of memory and in this, both may be seen as media of memory. Rituals secure 
the transient by iteration, texts by duration.
Textual continuity is only achieved when institutions of learning and exegesis arise 
that keep the ancient texts alive and semantically transparent. Since the texts themselves 
must not be altered, exegesis and commentary are the only means of innovation and of
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preserving the meaning of the texts in a changing world. All of the new religions that 
emerged since antiquity, most of them monotheistic and most of them in antagonistic 
opposition to older traditions and other religions which they reject as paganism, develop 
canons of sacred scripture and commentaries that translate the canonical texts into chang­
ing realities and conditions of understanding: Judaism and the Tanakh, Christianity and 
the Christian Bible, Islam and the Qur’an, Buddhism and the Pali-Canon, Jainism and 
the Jaina-Canon, Sikh religion and the Adi Cranth, Daoism, Confucianism, etc. down 
to the Mormons and the Book Mormon. This strong alliance between religions of this 
new type, the so-called world-religions, and the formation of canons and commentar­
ies illustrates once again the connection between memory and identity. The transition 
from ritual to textual continuity means a complete reorganisation of cultural memory in 
the same way as the transition from the ethnically and culturally determined religions of 
the Ancient world to the new type of transcultural and transnational world religions 
meant a totally new construction of identity, rhe canon, in a way, functioned as a new 
transethnical home-land and as a new trans-cultural formation and education.
Western cultural memory, however, is informed not only by the biblical canon but 
also by a parallel canon of Greek and Latin literature. It was the great achievement of 
Irish monks and Byzantine scholars, people working on the periphery of the ancient 
world, to have copied and thus rescued alongside religious literature a considerable part 
of pagan literature of Classical antiquity. There is no time to go into any details here, but 
this second canon should at least be mentioned, since we are dealing with a somewhat 
parallel project. More or less at the same time as the final redaction of the Biblical canon, 
the Alexandrinian philologists started to collect and to select the Greek literature by 
compiling lists of those works and authors that deserved to be edited and commented 
upon (hoiprattomenoi). These are the authors whom Aulus Gellius classified as “classici” 
employing the denomination of the first class of Roman taxpayers as a metaphor for the 
most important literary works and authors. Canonisation and classicism are typical phe­
nomena in the organisation of a cultural memory, not only in the West but everywhere 
where writing plays a fundamental role. In our Western tradition we observe not only 
several epochs and movements of a return to antiquity, of classicisms such as the Renais­
sance m Italy, the 17"' century in France, the “Augustan Age” in England and the decades 
around 1790 in Germany, but we also observe the formation of “Golden Ages” to which 
later epochs have recourse to, such as the Elizabethan Age in England, the epoch of 
Louis XIV in France, the time of Schiller and Goethe at Weimar or Mozart, Haydn and
Beethoven at Vienna (Vosskamp). The latter case is especially revealing since in music 
there is no possibility of a return to antiquity.
The distinction between the classical and the sacred canon lies in the fact that the 
sacred canon is closed and can only be amplified or modified by commentaries whereas 
the classical canon is open because every epoch except antiquity which is fixed may be­
come an object of recourse, recycling and reference for another epoch and the canon of 
“classics” changes and rearranges itself around a central stock of unquestionable works 
with every new work which is admitted to the canon. One cannot deny, however even
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to the classical canon a certain religious character. It seems evident that art, philosophy 
and religion have common roots and these roots lay in nothing other but cultural mem­
ory.
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